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The Political Economy of Workers' Compensation: 
Lessons For Product Liability 
By PATRICIA M. DANZON* 
Tort awTards for product-related injuries 
have risen rapidly in recent years. This trend 
reflects the outcome of court-made decisions, 
tempered only recently by modest statu- 
tory constraints. The workers' compensation 
(WC) system, under which employers are 
strictly liable for work-related injuries, is 
governed entirely by statute at the state level. 
It provides much lower benefits than does 
the tort system. There is little presumption 
that statutory choices for product liability 
reflect a social optimum, since voters in each 
state bear a larger share of the costs than the 
benefits of limiting consumers' rights against 
product manufacturers, many of whom are 
located out of state. By contrast, given 
the standard assumption that the costs and 
benefits of WC are borne by workers 
through compensating wage differentials, the 
WC system provides evidence on collective 
choices for compensation when costs and 
benefits of the political choices are internal- 
ized within the decision-making jurisdiction. 
This paper analyzes the political economy of 
the WC system. The purpose is to investigate 
whose preferences are reflected in the choice 
of the WC benefit structure and what lessons 
can be learned for the optimal design of 
compensation for product-related injuries 
and other injuries currently compensated 
through the tort system. 
One caveat is in order. The formal analy- 
sis of this paper views WC benefits as de- 
signed to provide compensation, thereby 
ignoring their effect on incentives for care by 
employers and employees. Ignoring deter- 
rence is appropriate only if employee moral 
hazard is negligible and if compensating wage 
demands for job risk provide employers with 
optimal incentives for safety. To the extent 
deterrence concerns are different in product 
liability, and if the single tort award must 
serve the dual function of deterrence and 
compensation, normative inferences from 
WC to product liability are tentative. 
Previous analyses of WC have tended to 
conclude that WC benefits provide subopti- 
mal compensation. The policy-oriented liter- 
ature has long argued that WC benefits are 
inadequate (for example, The Report of the 
National Commission..., 1972). In a recent 
study, W. Kip Viscusi and Michael Moore 
conclude that 
the observed rate at which workers are 
willing to trade off base wage rates for 
higher levels of compensation greatly 
exceeds the actuarial rate of trade-off, 
even taking into account the admin- 
istrative costs. These results suggest 
that benefit levels in 1976 were subop- 
timal, provided that one abstracts from 
moral hazard considerations. 
[1987, p. 260] 
Certain features of WC benefits seem incon- 
sistent with basic principles of optimal in- 
surance. Payment is more generous for 
routine minor injuries than for permanent 
total disabilities. Some states still limit the 
duration or the total amount of benefits for 
permanent disabilities. For temporary and 
permanent total disabilities, the typical wage 
replacement rate of two-thirds provides 
roughly full replacement of after-tax wages 
(ignoring noncash fringe benefits). But the 
maximum weekly benefit implies a sharply 
declining replacement rate at higher wage 
levels. The mean maximum benefit was .43 
of the state average weekly wage in 1965; the 
mean rose to .81 in 1985, with a range of .36 
to 2.32 (see my 1987 paper). 
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A finding that WC benefit levels are sub- 
optimal (i.e., below the level that workers 
would be willing to pay for) would be 
surprising since it would imply failure to 
maximize utility of workers and to minimize 
costs for employers. However the conclusion 
that WC benefits are suboptimal ignores im- 
portant differences between WC benefits and 
the model of the individual demand for com- 
pensation that underlies the inference of 
suboptimality. First, the WC benefit struc- 
ture, like any social insurance program, is a 
public good for all individuals covered. With 
heterogeneity of worker preferences, the 
common benefit structure is unlikely to be 
simultaneously optimal for all workers. This 
raises both the positive question of how the 
common benefit structure is determined and 
the normative question of the optimal level 
of such benefits. 
Second, the WC system is only one among 
several possible sources of insurance for wage 
loss and medical expense. The choice of 
state-level public coverages such as WC 
should be viewed as simultaneously de- 
termined with private health and disability 
insurance, taking as given the structure of 
federal programs such as SSDI and medi- 
care. The optimal structure of mandated 
public programs depends on the functioning 
of markets for private insurance. If private 
coverages were available at comparable cost 
to WC, since private coverages can be 
matched more closely to individual prefer- 
ences, it would be irrational for a state to 
incur the deadweight cost of mandating uni- 
form WC benefits. However, if private in- 
surance markets are subject to adverse selec- 
tion, myopia or free riding, mandatory 
coverages may be Pareto improving. 
I. Individual Choice of Benefits 
Consider first the case where insurance is 
a pure private good. In each period the 
worker faces an exogenous probability of 
injury p. If no injury occurs he receives a 
wage W; if an injury occurs he receives wage 
replacement benefits K. A cost-minimizing 
employer would select the cash wage W and 
benefits K to maximize the employee's util- 
ity, subject to the constraint that the ex- 
pected cost of the compensation package is 
equal to the potential wage with zero benefits 
we, which is also the value of marginal 
product under profit maximization. The util- 
ity-maximizing level of benefits satisfies 
(1) UO = U1(1 - t)(1 + h), 
where t is the worker's marginal tax rate; 
h ? 0 is the administrative cost per dollar of 
expected benefits (the load on the employer's 
insurance); and subscripts 0 and 1 denote 
the states of injury and no injury, respec- 
tively.' The individual's preferred replace- 
ment rate (k = K/W) can be written 
(2) k* = k(We, t, p, h). 
Comparative statics analysis indicates that 
k * < 0. With state independent utility and 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, k e < 0 
and k0 < O if taxes are proportional. With 
progressive taxes (dt/dWe> 0), k * would 
be positive; indeed, if (1 - t)(I + h) < 1, then 
k* would exceed unity. But if there is moral 
hazard with respect to either the occurrence 
of injuries or the duration of claims, this 
would impose the additional constraint K < 
W (1 ) with progressive tax rates this im- 
plies k < 0 and kWe <0.2 However, the 
very sharply declining replacement rate im- 
plied by the maximum benefit is not pre- 
dicted. These results may not hold if utility 
is state dependent. 
II. Collective Choice of Benefits 
Since the WC benefit structure is a public 
good within each state, equation (2) cannot 
be estimated for individuals. Given the small 
number of states, the assumption of Tiebout 
sorting of individuals to achieve homogene- 
1 This condition for optimal compensation when 
wages are taxed is also derived in Viscusi and Moore. 
2 For derivations, see my earlier paper. Although 
large firms are self-insured or self-rated, perfect experi- 
ence rating at the firm level may be insufficient to 
eliminate moral hazard at the level of the individual 
worker. R. J. Butler and J. D. Worrall (1983) conclude 
that there is a positive elasticity of claims with respect 
to benefit levels. 
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ity of preferences within states is not plausi- 
ble. Following T. E. Borcherding and R. T. 
Deacon (1972) and T. Bergstrom and R. 
Goodman (1973) the choices of benefit levels 
across states can provide information about 
individual preferences under certain assump- 
tions, specifically: 1) each voter chooses the 
k that maximizes his (or her) utility, given 
his "tax price" (s) per unit of K; 2) each 
voter's tax price s does not vary with the 
level of K; 3) in each state, the quantity 
-vFpp1icd js tiLic iLLVUIatl qUdnuiiy uemancea, 
which is the quantity demanded by the indi- 
vidual of median income (i.e., there is no 
vote trading); and 4) income distributions 
are proportional, as defined by Bergstrom 
and Goodman (p. 286). Given these assump- 
tions, each observation is an observation on 
the demand curve of a consumer with median 
income given his tax price. 
The most difficult variable to measure is 
the tax price (s). For publicly provided 
services such as education, each voter's tax 
share is determined by legislation. But, for 
public goods where the publicness lies in the 
mandating of a common level of private 
purchase, each individual's price depends on 
the prices he faces in private markets. In the 
short run (with all factors fixed in their 
current employments), the supply price per 
unit of K to the ith worker in firm j is 
simply si. = (1 + hj)pj./(l - pj), assuming 
that firms are perfectly experience rated and 
each worker pays a fully compensating wage 
offset. Let k * denote the preferred replace- 
ment rate of the i th worker in firm j, given 
s . It is the solution to equation (1) given 
the short-run supply price. 
But, in the long run, the effective supply 
price of K to any worker depends on the 
distribution of preferences of other workers, 
and on general equilibrium adjustments 
to the mandated level of benefits. Assume 
that the state arbitrarily mandates a replace- 
ment rate k such that for workers of type L, 
k > k, and for workers of type H, k < k . 
In the long run, type L workers who would 
prefer less than the statutory level of benefits 
(k > k,*) would not be willing to pay a fully 
compensating wage offset if they could get 
k, in another state or in the uncovered 
sector of the economy. Similarly, any type H 
worker for whom k < k and who can get 
kh elsewhere would require additional wage 
compensation. Thus mandatory benefits im- 
pose a tax on workers for whom k + k*. The 
tax for the i th worker is equal to the differ- 
ence between the cost to the employer and 
the worker's valuation of benefits: 
(3) Tij =pj/(1-pj)[(1+hh) 
-uolui(i - ti) ( k - k.* ) 
assuming within-firm homogeneity. The inci- 
dence of the tax depends on general equi- 
librium adjustments in factor and product 
markets. For any worker, the long-run supply 
price of K thus depends his share of the 
"tax" from mandating nonoptimal benefits 
for other workers. 
For any k, the effective tax T is more 
likely to be positive in small firms, since the 
load h is an inverse function of firm size. 
The magnitude of the tax also depends on 
the cost of supplementary insurance. Let g 
denote the load on private insurance. If g < h 
(perfect private supplementation), then k < 
kh imposes no tax on H. In practice, the per 
capita tax from k =t k* is likely to be higher 
for k > k* than for k < k*, with some dif- 
ferences by type of benefit. Sick pay and 
group long-term disability (LTD) insurance 
are very good substitutes for WC wage re- 
placement for high-wage workers (at least in 
large firms). Although most lower-wage 
workers do not have LTD coverage, SSDI 
provides replacement rates at least equal to 
the maximum that private insurers would 
permit. There is no private coverage com- 
parable to the permanent partial wage loss 
benefits provided by WC. Private group 
health insurance is a very good substitute for 
WC medical benefits for disabilities that 
leave the worker employable. But, if disabil- 
ity leads to loss of employment with access 
to group benefits, and if the individual does 
not qualify for medicare, private nongroup 
health insurance markets provide poor pro- 
tection against the risk of becoming high 
risk. Policies are individually underwritten, 
preexisting conditions are often surcharged 
or excluded from coverage, and loading 
charges are typically between .8 and 1 (with 
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higher loads for policies that guarantee re- 
newability) compared to loads of roughly .25 
or less for WC medical benefits. Thus the 
excess cost of suboptimal WC wage replace- 
ment is probably negligible. For long-term 
medical benefits and permanent partial wage 
loss, there is less presumption of asymmetry 
in the per capita excess cost from k < k* 
and k > k*. 
If g < h (perfect private supplementation), 
there would be unanimous choice of k = k 
unless k, is influenced by myopia or an 
intention to free ride. Even if g > h, type H 
workers may nevertheless vote for k, if g is 
still less than their effective supply price of 
WC benefits, including their share of the tax 
imposed on type L workers by mandating 
k > k,*. Thus the effective price to H of 
voting for k > k,* depends on the magnitude 
and the incidence of the tax on L, which 
depends on elasticities of factor supply, 
product demand and factor substitution. In 
general, if type L workers are mobile and 
type H workers are not, type H workers 
may bear part of any excess tax on L. 
The incidence of a tax on one type of 
labor, where the tax rate differs across states 
can be analyzed using Peter Mieskowski's 
(1972) general equilibrium analysis of the 
incidence of the local property tax on re- 
producible capital.3 Assume three factors of 
production: type L workers for whom k* 
<k; type H workers for whom k * > k; and 
capital F which includes imperfectly mobile 
factors such as land and small entrepreneurs. 
All factors are in fixed supply in the aggre- 
gate. L is perfectly mobile among states but 
H and F are imperfectly mobile. If the tax 
on L is uniform across states, the full inci- 
dence is on L. But, if the tax rate differs 
across states, L in high-tax states will not 
bear the cost differential in these states since 
wages of L (W,) will be equalized in all 
employments. W, falls by the average cost of 
benefits, including the average tax due to 
nonoptimal benefits. But the incidence of the 
deviations from the mean tax (both positive 
and negative) is on consumers and other 
immobile factors. Forward shifting may be 
possible for nontraded goods such as some 
retail trade, services, and construction. This 
is more likely if small firms, that face a 
relatively high tax rate due to higher costs of 
providing insurance and safety, do not com- 
pete in domestic markets with large firms 
that face lower loads for insurance and econ- 
omies of scale in producing safety. There 
may also be backward shifting to imperfectly 
mobile factors in high-benefit states and, in 
particular, to immobile factors in high-cost 
firms in high-benefit states. Of course, if L 
in high-cost firms is imperfectly mobile, then 
it will bear (part of) the excess tax. 
Thus with heterogeneous preferences and 
a common benefit structure, the standard 
assumption of an individually actuarially fair 
compensating wage differential for WC ben- 
efits may be incorrect and the choice of WC 
benefit levels may be affected. If type H are 
less mobile than type L workers, type H face 
an increasing marginal cost per unit of K, h', 
where h' is positively related to (k - k, to 
the elasticity of demand for domestically 
produced goods and to complementarities in 
production. If h' < g, there would be unani- 
mous choice of k, (ignoring myopia and 
free riding). This choice would be optimal in 
the sense that it avoids any deadweight loss 
from imposing a common level of benefits 
on individuals with heterogeneous prefer- 
ences. With h'> g mandatory benefits im- 
pose a deadweight loss and there is no pre- 
sumption that it will be minimized in the 
aggregate with a median voter model of 
political choice. However, provided the med- 
ian voter bears some share of the excess 
costs imposed on other workers, he would 
vote for a lower k than if k were a pure 
private good. 
II. Empirical estimates 
Table 1 reports OLS estimates for the log 
of the maximum weekly benefit (MAX) for 
temporary total and permanent total disabil- 
ity, for approximately 37 states in 1970, 1975, 
1980, and 1985. MAX is a public good for 
all workers with wages above the threshold 
3Paul Courant (1977) shows that the Mieskowski 
model is only approximately correct, but that suffices to 
establish the point being made here. 
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TABLE 1-MAXIMUM WEEKLY CASH BENEFIT (LOG) 
(1970, 1975, 1980, 1985) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
Intercept 4.724 3.52 
Wage (LOG) 0.083 0.41 
Injury Rate -0.000 -0.04 
POOR a -0.022 -3.15 
SMALLa - 0.047 -3.38 
UNIONa 0.003 0.60 
MANUFa 0.004 0.76 
A GRICa 0.280 6.38 
MININGa 0.007 0.36 
CONST a 0.026 --0.96 
SER VICESa 0.034 3.56 
EDUC > 12 0.007 1.16 
D75 0.083 1.30 
D80 0.196 2.09 
D85 0.153 1.14 
R 2 .739 
n =146 
aMeasured as percent. 
at which MAX is a binding constraint on the 
replacement rate, but for lower-wage workers 
it should be irrelevant if compensating wage 
differentials are individually fair and general 
equilibrium effects are irrelevant. The signifi- 
cant negative coefficient of the percent of 
low-income families (POOR) is consistent 
with the hypothesis that general equilibrium 
effects matter. Benefits are negatively related 
to the percent of workers in establishments 
of 20 or fewer employees (SMALL) which 
is consistent with a negative price elasticity 
of demand. The significant positive coeffi- 
cients of percent of workers in agriculture 
(A GRIC) and services (SERVICES) could 
reflect the higher cost of private supplemen- 
tation in these industries, as evidenced by 
the fact that a disproportionately high per- 
centage of workers in these industries lack 
private insurance. Dummy variables for 1975, 
1980, and 1985 are positive, although not 
highly significant. This suggests either that 
the threat of federal intervention following 
the National Commission had an effect or 
that WC is subject to some of the same 
influences that have lead to rising real tort 
awards and that these influences are not 
captured by the explanatory variables in- 
cluded here. The income elasticity (WAGE) 
is insignificantly different from zero. Union- 
ization and other measures of industrial mix 
are also insignificant. 
IV. Conclusions 
This analysis has several implications for 
interpreting the choice of WC benefits and 
drawing inferences for product liability. 
First, no worker votes for less than the bene- 
fits he (or she) is willing to pay for, given the 
effective supply price, h'. But h' depends not 
only on the load on his own employer's 
insurance but also of the difference between 
his preferences and those of other workers. 
General equilibrium adjustments in labor 
and product markets internalize to some ex- 
tent to each worker the excess costs that his 
choices impose on other workers. Second, 
willingness to pay for state-level mandatory 
benefits also depends on the availability of 
private supplementary benefits and federally 
financed public programs. Thus for some 
workers WC benefits may appear to be sub- 
optimal; but this is true only ignoring sup- 
plementation and ignoring the deadweight 
costs imposed on other workers from man- 
dating higher benefits. 
Both factors-supplementation and dead- 
weight costs from imposing common benefits 
on heterogeneous individuals-apply equally 
in the case of insurance for product-related 
injuries. WC benefits therefore provide a rea- 
sonable guide for optimal compensation 
through the tort system, ignoring deterrence. 
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